Edit: dnssec.h
/* * Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC") * * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, you can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. * * See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional * information regarding copyright ownership. */ #ifndef DNS_DNSSEC_H #define DNS_DNSSEC_H 1 /*! \file dns/dnssec.h */ #include <stdbool.h> #include <isc/lang.h> #include <isc/stdtime.h> #include <isc/stats.h> #include <dns/diff.h> #include <dns/types.h> #include <dst/dst.h> ISC_LANG_BEGINDECLS LIBDNS_EXTERNAL_DATA extern isc_stats_t *dns_dnssec_stats; /*%< Maximum number of keys supported in a zone. */ #define DNS_MAXZONEKEYS 32 /* * Indicates how the signer found this key: in the key repository, at the * zone apex, or specified by the user. */ typedef enum { dns_keysource_unknown, dns_keysource_repository, dns_keysource_zoneapex, dns_keysource_user } dns_keysource_t; /* * A DNSSEC key and hints about its intended use gleaned from metadata */ struct dns_dnsseckey { dst_key_t *key; bool hint_publish; /*% metadata says to publish */ bool force_publish; /*% publish regardless of metadata */ bool hint_sign; /*% metadata says to sign with this key */ bool force_sign; /*% sign with key regardless of metadata */ bool hint_remove; /*% metadata says *don't* publish */ bool is_active; /*% key is already active */ bool first_sign; /*% key is newly becoming active */ unsigned int prepublish; /*% how long until active? */ dns_keysource_t source; /*% how the key was found */ bool ksk; /*% this is a key-signing key */ bool legacy; /*% this is old-style key with no metadata (possibly generated by an older version of BIND9) and should be ignored when searching for keys to import into the zone */ unsigned int index; /*% position in list */ ISC_LINK(dns_dnsseckey_t) link; }; isc_result_t dns_dnssec_keyfromrdata(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdata_t *rdata, isc_mem_t *mctx, dst_key_t **key); /*%< * Creates a DST key from a DNS record. Basically a wrapper around * dst_key_fromdns(). * * Requires: *\li 'name' is not NULL *\li 'rdata' is not NULL *\li 'mctx' is not NULL *\li 'key' is not NULL *\li '*key' is NULL * * Returns: *\li #ISC_R_SUCCESS *\li #ISC_R_NOMEMORY *\li DST_R_INVALIDPUBLICKEY *\li various errors from dns_name_totext */ isc_result_t dns_dnssec_sign(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *set, dst_key_t *key, isc_stdtime_t *inception, isc_stdtime_t *expire, isc_mem_t *mctx, isc_buffer_t *buffer, dns_rdata_t *sigrdata); /*%< * Generates a RRSIG record covering this rdataset. This has no effect * on existing RRSIG records. * * Requires: *\li 'name' (the owner name of the record) is a valid name *\li 'set' is a valid rdataset *\li 'key' is a valid key *\li 'inception' is not NULL *\li 'expire' is not NULL *\li 'mctx' is not NULL *\li 'buffer' is not NULL *\li 'sigrdata' is not NULL * * Returns: *\li #ISC_R_SUCCESS *\li #ISC_R_NOMEMORY *\li #ISC_R_NOSPACE *\li #DNS_R_INVALIDTIME - the expiration is before the inception *\li #DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED - the key cannot sign this data (either * it is not a zone key or its flags prevent * authentication) *\li DST_R_* */ isc_result_t dns_dnssec_verify(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *set, dst_key_t *key, bool ignoretime, isc_mem_t *mctx, dns_rdata_t *sigrdata); isc_result_t dns_dnssec_verify2(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *set, dst_key_t *key, bool ignoretime, isc_mem_t *mctx, dns_rdata_t *sigrdata, dns_name_t *wild); isc_result_t dns_dnssec_verify3(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *set, dst_key_t *key, bool ignoretime, unsigned int maxbits, isc_mem_t *mctx, dns_rdata_t *sigrdata, dns_name_t *wild); /*%< * Verifies the RRSIG record covering this rdataset signed by a specific * key. This does not determine if the key's owner is authorized to sign * this record, as this requires a resolver or database. * If 'ignoretime' is true, temporal validity will not be checked. * * 'maxbits' specifies the maximum number of rsa exponent bits accepted. * * Requires: *\li 'name' (the owner name of the record) is a valid name *\li 'set' is a valid rdataset *\li 'key' is a valid key *\li 'mctx' is not NULL *\li 'sigrdata' is a valid rdata containing a SIG record *\li 'wild' if non-NULL then is a valid and has a buffer. * * Returns: *\li #ISC_R_SUCCESS *\li #ISC_R_NOMEMORY *\li #DNS_R_FROMWILDCARD - the signature is valid and is from * a wildcard expansion. dns_dnssec_verify2() only. * 'wild' contains the name of the wildcard if non-NULL. *\li #DNS_R_SIGINVALID - the signature fails to verify *\li #DNS_R_SIGEXPIRED - the signature has expired *\li #DNS_R_SIGFUTURE - the signature's validity period has not begun *\li #DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED - the key cannot sign this data (either * it is not a zone key or its flags prevent * authentication) *\li DST_R_* */ /*@{*/ isc_result_t dns_dnssec_findzonekeys(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbversion_t *ver, dns_dbnode_t *node, dns_name_t *name, isc_mem_t *mctx, unsigned int maxkeys, dst_key_t **keys, unsigned int *nkeys); isc_result_t dns_dnssec_findzonekeys2(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbversion_t *ver, dns_dbnode_t *node, dns_name_t *name, const char *directory, isc_mem_t *mctx, unsigned int maxkeys, dst_key_t **keys, unsigned int *nkeys); isc_result_t dns_dnssec_findzonekeys3(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbversion_t *ver, dns_dbnode_t *node, dns_name_t *name, const char *directory, isc_stdtime_t now, isc_mem_t *mctx, unsigned int maxkeys, dst_key_t **keys, unsigned int *nkeys); /*%< * Finds a set of zone keys. * XXX temporary - this should be handled in dns_zone_t. */ /*@}*/ bool dns_dnssec_keyactive(dst_key_t *key, isc_stdtime_t now); /*%< * * Returns true if 'key' is active as of the time specified * in 'now' (i.e., if the activation date has passed, inactivation or * deletion date has not yet been reached, and the key is not revoked * -- or if it is a legacy key without metadata). Otherwise returns * false. * * Requires: *\li 'key' is a valid key */ isc_result_t dns_dnssec_signmessage(dns_message_t *msg, dst_key_t *key); /*%< * Signs a message with a SIG(0) record. This is implicitly called by * dns_message_renderend() if msg->sig0key is not NULL. * * Requires: *\li 'msg' is a valid message *\li 'key' is a valid key that can be used for signing * * Returns: *\li #ISC_R_SUCCESS *\li #ISC_R_NOMEMORY *\li DST_R_* */ isc_result_t dns_dnssec_verifymessage(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg, dst_key_t *key); /*%< * Verifies a message signed by a SIG(0) record. This is not * called implicitly by dns_message_parse(). If dns_message_signer() * is called before dns_dnssec_verifymessage(), it will return * #DNS_R_NOTVERIFIEDYET. dns_dnssec_verifymessage() will set * the verified_sig0 flag in msg if the verify succeeds, and * the sig0status field otherwise. * * Requires: *\li 'source' is a valid buffer containing the unparsed message *\li 'msg' is a valid message *\li 'key' is a valid key * * Returns: *\li #ISC_R_SUCCESS *\li #ISC_R_NOMEMORY *\li #ISC_R_NOTFOUND - no SIG(0) was found *\li #DNS_R_SIGINVALID - the SIG record is not well-formed or * was not generated by the key. *\li DST_R_* */ bool dns_dnssec_selfsigns(dns_rdata_t *rdata, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, dns_rdataset_t *sigrdataset, bool ignoretime, isc_mem_t *mctx); bool dns_dnssec_signs(dns_rdata_t *rdata, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, dns_rdataset_t *sigrdataset, bool ignoretime, isc_mem_t *mctx); /*%< * Verify that 'rdataset' is validly signed in 'sigrdataset' by * the key in 'rdata'. * * dns_dnssec_selfsigns() requires that rdataset be a DNSKEY or KEY * rrset. dns_dnssec_signs() works on any rrset. */ isc_result_t dns_dnsseckey_create(isc_mem_t *mctx, dst_key_t **dstkey, dns_dnsseckey_t **dkp); /*%< * Create and initialize a dns_dnsseckey_t structure. * * Requires: *\li 'dkp' is not NULL and '*dkp' is NULL. * * Returns: *\li #ISC_R_SUCCESS *\li #ISC_R_NOMEMORY */ void dns_dnsseckey_destroy(isc_mem_t *mctx, dns_dnsseckey_t **dkp); /*%< * Reclaim a dns_dnsseckey_t structure. * * Requires: *\li 'dkp' is not NULL and '*dkp' is not NULL. * * Ensures: *\li '*dkp' is NULL. */ isc_result_t dns_dnssec_findmatchingkeys(dns_name_t *origin, const char *directory, isc_mem_t *mctx, dns_dnsseckeylist_t *keylist); isc_result_t dns_dnssec_findmatchingkeys2(dns_name_t *origin, const char *directory, isc_stdtime_t now, isc_mem_t *mctx, dns_dnsseckeylist_t *keylist); /*%< * Search 'directory' for K* key files matching the name in 'origin'. * Append all such keys, along with use hints gleaned from their * metadata, onto 'keylist'. Skip any unsupported algorithms. * * Requires: *\li 'keylist' is not NULL * * Returns: *\li #ISC_R_SUCCESS *\li #ISC_R_NOTFOUND *\li #ISC_R_NOMEMORY *\li any error returned by dns_name_totext(), isc_dir_open(), or * dst_key_fromnamedfile() * * Ensures: *\li On error, keylist is unchanged */ isc_result_t dns_dnssec_keylistfromrdataset(dns_name_t *origin, const char *directory, isc_mem_t *mctx, dns_rdataset_t *keyset, dns_rdataset_t *keysigs, dns_rdataset_t *soasigs, bool savekeys, bool publickey, dns_dnsseckeylist_t *keylist); /*%< * Append the contents of a DNSKEY rdataset 'keyset' to 'keylist'. * Omit duplicates. If 'publickey' is false, search 'directory' for * matching key files, and load the private keys that go with * the public ones. If 'savekeys' is true, mark the keys so * they will not be deleted or inactivated regardless of metadata. * * 'keysigs' and 'soasigs', if not NULL and associated, contain the * RRSIGS for the DNSKEY and SOA records respectively and are used to mark * whether a key is already active in the zone. */ isc_result_t dns_dnssec_updatekeys(dns_dnsseckeylist_t *keys, dns_dnsseckeylist_t *newkeys, dns_dnsseckeylist_t *removed, dns_name_t *origin, dns_ttl_t hint_ttl, dns_diff_t *diff, bool allzsk, isc_mem_t *mctx, void (*report)(const char *, ...)); /*%< * Update the list of keys in 'keys' with new key information in 'newkeys'. * * For each key in 'newkeys', see if it has a match in 'keys'. * - If not, and if the metadata says the key should be published: * add it to 'keys', and place a dns_difftuple into 'diff' so * the key can be added to the DNSKEY set. If the metadata says it * should be active, set the first_sign flag. * - If so, and if the metadata says it should be removed: * remove it from 'keys', and place a dns_difftuple into 'diff' so * the key can be removed from the DNSKEY set. if 'removed' is non-NULL, * copy the key into that list; otherwise destroy it. * - Otherwise, make sure keys has current metadata. * * If 'allzsk' is true, we are allowing KSK-flagged keys to be used as * ZSKs. * * 'hint_ttl' is the TTL to use for the DNSKEY RRset if there is no * existing RRset, and if none of the keys to be added has a default TTL * (in which case we would use the shortest one). If the TTL is longer * than the time until a new key will be activated, then we have to delay * the key's activation. * * 'report' points to a function for reporting status. * * On completion, any remaining keys in 'newkeys' are freed. */ isc_result_t dns_dnssec_syncupdate(dns_dnsseckeylist_t *keys, dns_dnsseckeylist_t *rmkeys, dns_rdataset_t *cds, dns_rdataset_t *cdnskey, isc_stdtime_t now, dns_ttl_t hint_ttl, dns_diff_t *diff, isc_mem_t *mctx); /*%< * Update the CDS and CDNSKEY RRsets, adding and removing keys as needed. */ ISC_LANG_ENDDECLS #endif /* DNS_DNSSEC_H */
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